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COMMENTARY
REFLECTIONS: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION*
Arthur J. Goldberg"
It is a great honor and privilege to speak at the Notre Dame Law School
and commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education.'
It is most appropriate that the Center for Civil Rights be established at
Notre Dame. Its President, the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, is one of the
nation's outstanding leaders in the cause of equal rights and equal justice.
Father Hesburgh has been for many years, and continues to be, a great spiritual
warrior in the continuing struggle for freedom and equality. As we all should,
he acknowledges equal rights for all as the will of God, in whose image all per-
sons are created; yet, he recognizes by both deed and word that it remains true,
as President Kennedy once said, "that here on earth God's will must truly be
our own."
We meet at a time of profound cynicism and disillusionment about our
government, its leaders, and the political process. This cynicism is understand-
able. Watergate has shocked this nation and rightly so. Watergate involves
allegations and evidence before congressional committees and the courts that
high officials of our government authorized and participated in illegal bugging,
illegal disruption of the political process, perjury, political favoritism influencing
governmental decision-making, violation of the election laws, cover-up and
obstruction of justice, and misprision of felony.
Cynicism and discouragement likewise permeate the civil rights move-
ment. It is only honest to admit this. Some civil rights adherents say that the
great promise of Brown has not been fully realized. In this, they are right; but
they are not right in "copping out." The struggle to overcome centuries of racial
discrimination in so many aspects of American life is bound to be arduous and
frustrating. Thomas Paine aptly warned that: "Those who expect to reap the
blessings of freedom must ... undergo the fatigue of supporting it."
Some civil rights adherents say that Brown was initially right in holding
that separate can never be equal but that since equality is still denied, let us
return to separatism, for at least by so doing we can preserve our pride and
safeguard our identity. I understand this reaction and am a firm believer in a
pluralistic rather than a homogenized society. But the goal of an integrated
and desegregated public education decreed by Brown is worthy of our continuing
efforts and must not be abandoned because of fatigue and discouragement.
* The author delivered this address at the dedication of the reading room of the 'Center
for Civil Rights at the Notre Dame Law School on March 22, 1974.
** Former Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court. The author would like to
acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Bruce Sokler, a third-year student at the Georgetown
University Law Center, in the preparation of this article.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
There are those who despair that the struggle for human rights seems to
be ever enduring and even never ending and that it is too much to expect
continuing pursuit of Martin Luther King's dream when the dream appears to
be merely such and far from reality. To these, I would say, to paraphrase Tenny-
son, more things are wrought by dreams than this world conceives of.
There are those, formerly part of the great coalition that forged Brown,'
who now fear that Brown, carried to its logical conclusion in seeking to eliminate
racial discrimination against Blacks in education, will do so at the expense of
other racial and ethnic minorities which have suffered grievous discrimination.
To the adherents of civil rights who have expressed these fears and concerns,
most recently in briefs filed in the DeFunis case,3 I would say, you are misguided
in your fears and are simply wrong. To eliminate the vestiges of slavery, as
promised by the thirteenth amendment-to seek to correct an injustice existing
since the very foundation of this country-is a moral and constitutional obli-
gation.
It is understandable that victims of past discrimination in educational
opportunity react against the specter of the imposition of quotas. The fact is,
however, that no responsible adherent of civil rights proposes the restoration of a
quota system: the infamous numerus clausus.4 The affirmative action program
of seeking to admit a moderate-indeed, a modest-number of Black students
to law schools and other institutions of higher learning is an essential element
in a program to correct an historic inequity. It is not a program to establish a
quota system for admission of students to institutions of higher education.
All agree that some form of affirmative action is required, but some over-
look the teaching of Brown that the most effective type of affirmative action pro-
gram to overcome past injustices is for Black students to share an educational
experience with other students by admission to their ranks.' Preparatory courses
2 Twenty years ago, many groups united with the N.A.A.C.P. in urging the Court to
take this "great civilizing step" of overturning the "separate but equal" principle of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This coalition included the federal government, repre-
sented by the Justice Department; Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Con-
gress; labor groups such as the American Federation of Teachers and the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations; defenders of civil rights such as the American Civil Liberties Union and
the American Council on Human Rights, and other interested groups such as the American
Veterans Committee. See Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 485-86 (1954).
3 The fallout from the coalition that helped bring Brown about is evidenced by the
briefs in the pending Supreme Court case of DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
The American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League,
the AFL-CIO and other groups generally supportive of civil rights filed amici briefs in sup-
port of DeFunis. On the other hand, Jewish organizations, such as the National Council of
Jewish Women and the Union of Hebrew Congregations; union groups such as the United
Farm Workers, United Auto Workers, United Mine Workers, and State, County and Municipal
Employees; The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; the National Education
Association; the Children's Fund; the ACLU; the N.A.A.C.P; the Legal Defense Fund and
other important organizations have fied briefs in support of the disputed program of the
Law School of Washington. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a motion
supported by a brief as amicus curiae in support of the program, but Solicitor General Bork
disavowed this brief for the government and upon his application the Supreme Court rejected
it.
4 It is in these terms that the issue has been phrased in some of the briefs filed in DeFunis.
See Brief of the Anti-Defamation League at 2 (Question is: Whether a state may establish
a racial quota).
5 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). The importance of
the admission of the minority student to an integrated legal classroom was recognized even
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are useful but actual admission to an integrated classroom provides real educa-
tional benefits to white and black students alike.
There is a clear and present danger that the fissure in the civil rights
coalition evident in the DeFunis case will widen to the busing and other difficult
cases which are coming to the courts for adjudication.' This would be a matter
of very great regret.
There is perhaps an even greater danger: division in the great coalition
in the Supreme Court of the United States established in Brown and persisting
in its progeny. Brown itself was a unanimous decision" and, during the Warren
era, s all school desegregation cases were unanimous.9 But the Court, as presently
constituted, for the first time since Brown, has begun to divide on certain issues
involving desegregation of public education." It would be most tragic if this
greatest of coalitions disintegrates. A civil rights coalition may urge; the Supreme
Court decides. And, equally important, the Supreme Court is often the moral
conscience of the nation. It was in Brown; it should remain so with the authority
which unanimity provides.
Brown, as all historians of the Supreme Court agree, is one of its most
significant decisions. One of the reasons is that Brown transcended the momen-
tous issue of integrating public education. Brown had a profound impact as a
constitutional signpost pointing towards the elimination of all kinds of legal
barriers based on race and as a landmark from which broadened changes in
Black-White relations can be dated. It reflected a subtle trend of constitutional
before Brown. In 1950, the Court in Sweatt v. Painter held that the education that a Black
student could receive at a law school established for Blacks could never be equal to the
legal education at the University of Texas Law School. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). To the Court,
the fact that the ostensibly objective facilities were equivalent was not controlling. As Chief
Justice Vinson stated:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities include reputation of the
faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions, and prestige.
Id. at 634.
6 See Milliken v. Bradley, cert. granted, Nov. 19, 1973, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov.
20, 1973) (Nos. 73-434, 73-435, 73-436) (geographic boundaries); Gonzales v. Fairfax-
Brewster Schools, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2351,
4th Cir. Nov. 13, 1973 (desegregation of private school under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 I use this term to designate the chronological period during which Earl Warren was
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and the term "the Burger Court" to desig-
nate the present Court.
9 See, e.g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. Board of
Education, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Burger Court has been able to remain unanimous on cer-
tain issues. See Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Alexander v. Board of
Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
10 In Wright v. Council of 'City of Emporia, the Court split 5-4 on whether a municipality
can break off from an existing school district which has not yet completed the process of
dismantling a system of enforced racial segregation. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). The Court in
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, while concurring in result, disagreed as to the
proper timetable for the implementation of a court-ordered pupil transfer plan. 396 U.S.
290 (1970). And in two important desegregation cases last term the Court also divided.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Justice Rhenquist dissented, while Justices Douglas and
Powell wrote concurring opinions. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In Bradley v. School Board, the
Court affirmed by an equally divided, vote, with Justice Powell not participating, a lower




adjudication, an indication of an attitude by the Supreme Court to focus on
issues before it in a different way than prior Courts.11
In deciding Brown, the Court cut through the fiction surrounding the old
"separate but equal" doctrine to reach the reality which had always been pa-
tently obvious to all who were willing to see: "separate" could never be "equal"
since its very genesis and its only purpose for being was to be invidiously dis-
criminatory, to keep the Black man in an inferior status.12 But self-evident as
this has always been, it was not until 1954-just twenty years ago and almost
one hundred years after the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments-that the Court was willing to accord a full constitutional recog-
nition and significance to this unmistakable reality.
The willingness to look at the real impact of governmental action, to search
for truth amid the fictions of legal doctrine, brought a new freshness to con-
stitutional adjudication and a recognition that the basic law must be willing
to grapple with everyday reality. This is why the Warren Court became a place
of particular promise and hope for Black people who were thereby encouraged
to believe that racial justice is actually attainable and that the law could under-
stand their own reality in a way which would allow it to frame meaningful
relief from the everyday denials of constitutional principle and right. " The
stifling of this new realism by division in the Supreme Court or by a cutting
back on Brown would set back the great goal of equal justice under law.
I conclude by making this appeal: to adherents of civil rights who have
become discouraged and cynical, I say that this is not the time for the summer
soldier or the sunshine patriot. The road ahead in the march for equality, in
law and in fact, is filled with great obstacles difficult to surmount. But we must
persevere if we are to bring the full blessings of freedom and equality to us and
to our posterity.
Therefore, it is imperative that those who genuinely believe in civil rights
persist in their efforts with courage and fortitude. Racial segregation and dis-
crimination continue, but it is lesser in degree than when Brown was decided.
This no one can deny.
True, the pace for total elimination of racial discrimination has been with
all too deliberate speed. 4 But the Supreme Court itself has abandoned this
concept. Today the constitutional mandate for equality is for the here and
now and not a mere promise for the indefinite future. 5
Furthermore, the areas of denial of civil rights encompass important areas
in addition to education: jobs, housing, voting, criminal and civil justice, and
accommodations that are public in fact although private in form. The elimi-
nation of racial barriers against equality in these aspects of American life simply
is too important to permit cynicism, discouragement, or halfhearted dedication
to rectifying injustice.
I also appeal to the coalition of civil rights adherents, splintered in the
11 A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JusTicE 22 (1971).
12 Id. at 21.
13 Id. at 23.
14 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
15 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
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DeFunis case, not to engage in acrimony, but to seek to restore the prior unity
which existed, not by compromise-because compromise of constitutional prin-
ciples is impermissible-but by returning to a common program of seeking to
eliminate racial discrimination by supporting realistic remedies rather than sub-
mitting to ill-founded fears.
It would be presumptuous for me to appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus,
I can only express the hope that the Court will unite as it did during the Warren
era in support of that concept nobly expressed on the great edifice which houses
the Court: Equal Justice Under Law.
Finally, I also express the hope that the people of this country will abjure
prejudice, fear and hate, and will apply and practice the teachings of our
common Judaic-Christian tradition-that all men are God's children, created in
His image.
In Brown, the Court did its duty, under circumstances reminiscent of an
earlier decision of the Supreme Court, Worcester v. Georgia,6 decided in 1832.
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the claim of the Cherokee Indians to
treaty land against annexation by the State of Georgia. This ruling aroused
great anger on the part of President Jackson and Georgia. There were rumors
and even threats that both the President and Georgia would decline to follow
the Court's decision. Referring to these reports, Justice Story, in a letter to a
friend, said this:
Georgia is full of anger and violence. What she will do, it is difficult to
say. Probably she will resist the execution of our judgment, and if she does,
I do not believe the President will interfere.... The rumor is, that he has
told the Georgians he will do nothing. I, for one, feel quite easy on this
subject, be the event what it may. The Court has done its duty. Let the
Nation now do theirs.1
7
In May of 1954, the Court in Brown did its duty. Now, in 1974 and in
the years to come, let both the present Court and the Nation do theirs by ful-
filling the still-unrealized American creed that all men are created free and
equal.
16 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
17 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926).
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